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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
)

UNION BANK, N.A., a national
banking association,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)

vs.

JV L.L.C., an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendant/Appellant,
And
NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability
company,

Defendant/Appellant,
And
PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, DAN JACOBSON, an
individual, SAGE HOLDINGS LLC,
an Idaho limited liability
company, TIMBERLINE
INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
STEVEN G. LAZAR, an individual,
an individual, AMY KORENGUT, an
individual, HLT REAL ESTATE
LLC, PANHANDLE STATE BANK, an
Idaho corporation, R.E. LOANS,
LLC, a California limited
liability company, WELLS FARGO
FOOTHILL, INC, a Delaware
corporation, PEND OREILLE
BONNER DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS,

DOCKET NO. 42479

)

(Bonner County
Case 2011-0135)

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
}
}
)
)
)

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY
BRIEF

INC., a Nevada corporation,
PENSCO TRUST CO. custodian
f/b/a Barney Ng, a California
corporation, MORTGAGE FUND '08
LLC, a California limited
liability company, B-K
LIGHTING, INC., a California
corporation, FREDERICK J.
GRANT, an individual, CHRISTINE
GRANT, an individual, RUSS
CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, an Arizona
limited liability company,
JOSEPH DUSSICH, an individual,
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK, an Idaho
corporation, STATE OF IDAHO,
Department of Revenue and
Taxation, MONTAHENO INVESTMENTS
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, TOYON INVESTMENTS LLC,
a Nevada limited liability
company, CHARLES W. REEVES and
ANN B. REEVES, husband and
wife, ACI NORTHWEST, INC . , an
Idaho corporation, DOES 1
through 20 inclusive,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
)
}
)
}
}

Defendants/Respondents.

)
}

* * * * *
Appeal from the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Bonner

* * * * *
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL GRIFFIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

* * * * *
Gary A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Attorney for Appellant, JV

Christopher Pooser
Stoehl Rives, LLC
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
Attorney for Respondent, Bank
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COMES NOW the Appellant, J.V., LLC, and files its REPLY
brief, as follows:
DENIAL OF JV'S MOTION FOR J'uDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

The Respondent's Brief, in the Section V. Argument,
heading~' argues that on JV's Motion For Judgment on the
pleadings, the District Court did not consider "any matters
outside of the pleadings" and that the District Court
properly denied JV's Motion.

The Respondent's Brief fails

to recite the actual facts that the Bank's First Amended
Complaint did not allege the word "subordinate" or any words
of fact as to how or why the Bank's Mortgage recorded August
6, 2008 could be senior to JV's Mortgage recorded June 19,
2006.
The Bank's pleading, Second Claim for Relief was in
paragraph 5 seeking "For a determination that the lien
created by the Note and Mortgage is valid, enforceable and
existing as against the Defendants and the property
described therein and for a decree of foreclosure." (R. Vol.
I, p. 135, p.5}.

There was not pleading of any particular

priority of the Bank's recorded Mortgage, which was
recorded, in 2008, over a year later than JV's Mortgage
recorded in 2006.

So, there is no way the pleadings

disclosed a theory, factually or legally, as to how the
Bank's Mortgage could have priority over JV's Mortgage.

Idaho law is clear that the prayer for relief is not
of the cause of action.

As stated in JV's Appellant's
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Brief, the prayer of a complaint is nothing more than a
statement of the pleader's opinion of what the facts stated
in the Bank's amended complaint, without dispute alleged
JV's Mortgage recorded in 2006 would be prior to the Bank's
Mortgage recorded in 2008.

The prayer forms no part of a

statement of a cause of action, facts alleged and not the
relief demanded are of chief important.
In summary, no part of the Bank's Respondent's Brief
submits any facts or law, as to its later recorded Mortgage
could be superior to JV's Mortgage.

Idaho's race/notice

statutes give priority to the first in time recording.

The

"Subordination Agreement" was totally outside and missing
from the facts alleged even considering the standard that
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
pleader is entitled to relief.
Respondent's Brief claims that its Mortgage recorded in

2008 had priority by reason of subordination.
B.

Respondents Bank claims the District Court's

decision on summary judgment was correct.

The Legal

Standards were correctly set forth by the District Court,
but the District Court was in error to hold that the facts
entitled the Bank to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The District Court only expressed its conclusions.
facts were at issue and disputed on the record.

The

JV's

Affidavit of James W. Berry was lengthy and factual that the
Bank gave no consideration, JV had no contract or agreement
-3-

with the Bank.

Charles Reeves for the land owner, POBD,

obtained JV's signature based on fraudulent
misrepresentations.

The Subordination Agreement had a place

for the Bank Officer's signature, which was unsigned and
remain in blank.

The Bank submitted nothing in dispute of

the Affidavit of James Berry.

The Respondent's Brief, page

10, cites the rule that "based on undisputed evidence ... the
Court can make "inferences".

That theory of law does not

apply because the facts and evidence were entirely in
dispute.
The District Court was short on findings, only
concluding that a valid subordination (sic} contract was
entered into by which JV's mortgage was made inferior to
UB's Mortgage.

The Subordination Agreement was not signed

and recorded until August 6, 2008, a copy of i t is on page

086 of Respondent's Brief as an appendix.

The Subordination

Agreement could not be an inducement for the Bank to loan
POBD $5.0 million dollars, because the money loan occurred
in October of 2007, with no mortgage, then the loan was
renewed by a new mortgage on the real estate recorded March
25, 2008.

The Subordination Agreement was long after the

Bank Loans, and the Bank's Mortgage was recorded four (4)
months ahead of the Subordination Agreement.
The Respondent Bank, paragraph B. 1. claims that JV
presented no legal authority on its argument that summary
judgment was improper, which is not accurate.
-4-

JV's

Appellant's Brief, on its issue II, covers pages 14 through
19, and it uses the facts from the record, and the
applicable law.

With all of JV's Affidavit facts undisputed

or contested in any way, the District Court's summary
judgment is reversible error.
In JV's caption III, JV submitted that on its Motion To
Alter, Amend, and Reconsider, the District Court erred by
refusing to consider additional facts, being 3 letters from
POBD's Attorney, Mr. Sterling.

The 3 email letters from

Attorney Sterling were to induce JV to subordinate its first
lien Mortgage.

The District Judge did not permit those

email letters and the facts therein contained to be admitted
at all, but he gave no reasons for that ruling.

JV's

Respondent's Brief, pages 24 through 29, in detail shows
facts that the representations of Sterling's 3 email letters
were false.

The Bank's response is at paragraph C, page 24

of Respondent's Brief stating that JV's new evidence failed
to raise an issue of fact.

JV submits that the District

Judge refused to consider the new evidence.

Decisions on

summary judgments are interlocutory in the sense that the
facts and issues can be reconsidered at any time, within
fourteen

(14) days of the final judgment.

Rule ll(a} (2) (B)

Motion For Reconsideration, a motion to reconsider any
interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any
, but not later than 14

judgment.

after entry of

In the Amended

and
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, R. VII.,

p. 1479, the District Court, end of the first paragraph,
stated the Court ... will not consider the three 3-mails;
however, no reason was given.
The rule is stated in Idaho First National v. David

Steed, 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992) that on a Rule
ll(a) (2) (B) a party filing a motion to reconsider may submit
additional new facts, which the Court must consider in
ruling on JV's Motion to Reconsider.

A summary judgment is

interlocutory as no final judgment exists.

"The order

granting summary judgment was an interlocutory order, not a
final order" (Idaho First National v. David Steed, 121 Idaho
356 at 361).

For example, in Coeur d'Alene Mining v. First

National Bank 0£ Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026, the
Supreme Court noted that when presented with a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to
I.R.C.P. ll(a) (2) (B) "the trial court should take into
account any new facts presently by the moving party that
bear on the correctness of an interlocutory order." (Coeur

d'Alene Mining v. First National Bank 0£ Idaho, 118 Idaho at
823.
The Bank submits the Court's refusal to exclude the
emails was harmless.

(Respondent Brief p. 26) JV's

Appellant's Brief, pages 23 through 29, analyzes each
separate email and points out that the facts and
representations made
inducements

were false

POBD's
JV

to

the Subordination Agreement.
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Bank's Respondent's Brief, paragraph E, page 30 is its
claim that JV was properly excluded from the trial.

The

Bank goes on to acknowledge that proper due process requires
some process to insure the individual is not deprived of his
rights, and the Bank states, mainly "an individual must be
provided with notice and opportunity to be heard"
(Respondent's Brief, page 31).

In response to the District

Judge's Letter Order, JV filed an Objection and Motion to
Set Aside the Court's Letter to Counsel.

The District Court

made no response, no hearing was offered, held, and the
District Court proceeded through trial in total disregard of
JV's procedural due process rights.

Respondent Bank does

not refer to any opportunity for JV to be heard but claims
that because JV was provided opportunity to be heard on the
first summary judgment and then on reconsideration.
(Respondent's Brief, page 32, beginning paragraph).
JV submits that prior hearings on summary judgment and

reconsideration had nothing to do with the Court's Letter of
April 30, 2014, which occurred subsequently, months later.
The Respondent's Brief seems to entirely support JV's issue
that JV was entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard.
D.

District Court's Refusal to Allow JV to discover

the full Settlement Agreement by the Bank and its Debtors,

POBD, BOLBY and MERSCHEL.
that it was a matter of

The Respondent Bank

pure discretion for the District Judge to deny JV's motion
-7-

to discover the Bank's Restructure and Settlement Agreement
between i t and its debtor POBD, Merschel and Bolby.

The

Respondent Bank submitted as legal authority the rule that
IRCP 26 (b} (1) permits broad discovery ... so long as i t is
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

{Respondent's Brief, page 29, first

para, cases cited).
JV's reply is:
a}

The Bank's attorney, in open court, had previously

said, "I don't have a problem giving him the gl.obal
settlement document." (Tr. Vol 2., p. 96, 11.9-11).

This

statement stipulation by Bank's counsel binds the Bank to
furnish the document requested.
b}

The District Court entered a written Order which

stated that he "it (sic) did not find the agreement to be
relevant to the remaining issues in this case; however the
document may lead to relevant evidence".

(Order Re:

Discovery, R. Vol. VII, p. 1539).
In other words, the District Court did find the
standard recognized by Respondent's Brief that discovery is
permitted of any matter, "so long as i t is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The District Judge explicitly stated the rule permitting
discovery of the matter (Settlement Agreement of the Bank
and Debtor)

admissible evidence.

could

to discovery of

However, the District Court did not
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define the "remaining issues" or how the document "may lead
to discovery of relevant evidence".

(This is at R., Vol.

VII, page 1539-40; the Appellant's Brief, page 31, 3rct line,
in error referred to i t as Vol II, it is in fact in Vol.
VII.)
Only a "redacted" copy was furnished, and it is in
evidence as Defendant NIR Exhibit SSS.

In paragraph 3

Reaffirmation of Obligations i t was stated that all terms
and conditions of the Loan Documents would remain in force
and effect.

The relevance of that provision is that the

LOAN DOCUMENTS include a Collateral Pledge of cash by Bolby
of 2.5 million and Marschel of 2.5 million, a total of $5.0
million dollars in cash collateral that should have applied
to almost entirely pay-off the Note and Mortgage to the
Bank.
Of a matter of course in the proceedings, JV was not
heard on its motion to quash the Judge's Letter denying JV
the right to sit at counsel table and participate in the
trial.

That also denied JV any opportunity to present the

discoverable evidence of how, why, where, did the $5.0
million Cash Collateral go?

It was not applied to the loan

at all, as the Bank was suing to foreclose a $5.0 million
dollar Mortgage on the real estate when in fact i t held 5.0
million cash collateral to pay the Loan, without the need to

the

as to the first $5 0

in fact held by the Bank as collateral.
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cash was

The Bank never

asserted that the full Settlement Agreement was privileged,
nor did the District Court find it was privileged.

JV submits i t was denied discoverable knowledge of the
facts of the $5.0 million cash collateral, which is a
substantial prejudice to JV

&

NIR.

ATTORNEY FEES
Respondent's Brief seeks attorney fees on this appeal,
as a "commercial transaction" under Idaho Code §12-120(3).
There was no commercial transaction between the parties, the
Bank, and JV.

The Bank was not a party to the Subordination

Agreement, and the interest of JV was only as a Mortgage
holder on the same real estate as the Bank's Mortgage.

The

Bank's Mortgage being recorded in 2008 and JV's Mortgage
recorded in 2006.

The only issue between the Bank and JV

was the priority of each other's Mortgage on the same real
estate.

This action did not involve a "commercial

transaction".

The "gravamen" of the Bank's action against

JV was not a commercial transaction because i t is not
integral to the claim upon which the Bank was seeking
against JV.

This action was primarily a priority as to real

property dispute.

(Sun

Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Ke1sey,

131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041(1998).
UNION BANK CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES BY IDAHO CODE §12121
Union Bank claims the

issues and

are brought or

1
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Brief

unreasonably, or without

foundation.

JV agrees that such is the standard under Idaho

Code §12-121.
JV submits that the factual record shows JV validly
pursued having a priority mortgage on the real estate at
issue.

JV should have been entitled to judgment on the

pleadings because the facts allege the date of recording for
JV in 2006 and the Bank in 2008.

There was not one word

about "Subordination" (Agreement), as the prayer for relief
is not part of the cause of action or factual allegation, i t
is only opinion of the pleader.

The Affidavit of James

Berry alleged substantial facts so that the facts were
subject to genuine issues of material fact.

The District

Judge refused to consider JV's additional evidence on
reconsideration of the interlocutory order of summary
judgment.

JV was denied discovery of evidence (Settlement

Agreement)

that the District Judge found would lead to

discovery of relevant evidence.
The Trial by the District Judge was ordered to be
without JV having any participation.

There was no

opportunity to be heard and no meaningful hearing, at all.
JV'S RELIEF ON ITS REPLY
JV moves the Supreme Court to deny attorney fees to the
Respondent Bank, and to reverse the District Court and to
remand the matter to the District Court for new proceedings
and a new trial.

JV moves the

to find and hold

JV had the first priori
-11-

Court

recorded June 19, 2006 and the Bank held a subsequently
recorded mortgage recorded March 25, 2008.

The

Subordination Agreement did not bind JV as a contract, there
was no consideration, and it was obtained by fraud in the
inducement.

Because the Subordination Agreement was

recorded August 6, 2008, over 4 months after the Bank's
Mortgage, so the Bank could not be a third party
beneficiary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~~ day of December, 2015.

Gary A. Finney
Attorney for Appellant JV

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing was served as indicated, this
day
of September, 2015, and addressed as follows:
Christopher Pooser
Stoehl Rives, LLC
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
VIA US MAIL
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
VIA US MAIL
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recorded June 19, 2006 and the Bank held a subsequently
recorded mortgage recorded March 25, 2008.

The

Subordination Agreement did not bind JV as a contract, there
was no consideration, and it was obtained by fraud in the
inducement.

Because the Subordination Agreement was

recorded August 6, 2008, over 4 months after the Bank's
Mortgage, so the Bank could not be a third party
beneficiary.

-(':#
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/7 .:.---day of December, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing was served as indicated, this
/'fl::±: day
of December,
2015, and addressed as follows:
Christopher Pooser
Stoehl Rives, LLC
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900
Boise, ID 83702-7705
VIA US MA.IL
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
VIA US MA.IL
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/7 ,:....,-day of December, 2015.
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for Appellant JV
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